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Abstract 
This paper draws lessons from long run trends in energy markets for energy and climate policy. An 
important lesson is that consumer responses to energy markets change with economic development. The 
British experience suggests that income elasticities1 of demand for energy services have tended to follow 
an inverse-U shape curve. Thus, at low levels of economic development, energy service consumption 
tends to be quite responsive to per capita income changes; at mid-levels, consumption tends to be very 
responsive to changes in income per capita; and, at high levels, consumption is less responsive to income 
changes. The paper also highlights the importance of formulating integrated energy service policies to 
reduce risks to developing countries of locking-in to carbon intensive infrastructure or behaviour. 
Without guidance and incentives, rapid economic development is likely to lock consumers into high 
energy service prices in the long run and bind the economy onto a high energy intensity trajectory with 
major long run economic and environmental impacts. Thus, effective energy service policies in periods of 
rapid development, such as in China and India at present, are crucial for the long run prosperity of the 
economy and their future ability to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions.  
                                                          
1 The income elasticity of demand for an energy service indicates the percentage change in the consumption of the energy service 
for a one percent change in income. For example, an income elasticity of 0.5 (or 1.5) implies that, if income rises by 10%, 
consumption will increase by 5% (or 15%, respectively). Similarly, the price elasticity indicates the percentage change in the 
consumption of the energy service for a one percent change in the price of the energy service. That is, a price elasticity of -0.5 (or 
-1.5) implies that, if prices rise by 10%, consumption will fall by 5% (or 15%, respectively).    
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1. Introduction 
The anthropogenic effects on climate change have their roots in the Industrial Revolution and the 
associated transformation of the energy system. In particular, it set the global economy on a trajectory of 
rising levels of energy consumption, with great benefits to mankind, and carbon dioxide emissions, with 
more worrying consequences. More generally, technological, institutional and behavioural lock-ins imply 
that energy systems have remained unchanged for long periods of time (Aghion et al. 2014, Acemoglu et 
al. 2015, Fouquet 2016).  
As a result, climate strategies and policies, particularly those related to transforming the energy system, 
need to look decades or even centuries into the future. However, most climate policies are formulated on 
the basis of short or medium run perspectives – rarely analysing experiences more than a decade or two in 
the past.  
Probably reflecting the growing need to look back, many notable books and journal articles have been 
published in the past decade on the history and long run nature of energy markets and their environmental 
effects (e.g., Fouquet 2008, Allen 2009, Ayres and Warr 2009, Wrigley 2010, Smil 2010, Mitchell 2011, 
Kander et al. 2013, Jones 2014, Grübler and Wilson 2014). These built on earlier generations of studies 
related to energy history (including Nef 1926, Schurr and Netschert 1960, Cipolla 1962, Landes 1969, 
von Tunzelmann 1978, Flinn 1984, Wrigley 1988, Smil 1994, Nye 1998, Grübler 1998). 
The study of the history of energy has offered a number of valuable insights of relevance for today’s 
energy markets and climate policy. For instance, it is important to remember that the evolution of energy 
technologies has been slow and painfully influenced by the teething problems and idiosyncrasies of the 
technologies (Smil 1994). However, the personalities of entrepreneurs, such as James Watt, Thomas 
Edison or Nikola Tesla, selling and promoting technologies have also played an important role (Smil 
2010). Indeed, certain technologies have been selected on the basis of these and other early influences in 
their history, locking the economy into particular combinations of technologies and institutions (Cowan 
1990, Grübler et al. 1999, Unruh 2000, 2002). Often the successful uptake of specific technologies 
depended on timing of the introduction and development of technologies, industries and institutions that 
enabled new energy sources to emerge from niches and become core elements in the regime (Geels 2002, 
Foxon 2011).  
Furthermore, the diffusion of new energy technologies and sources has had major impacts on the 
economy and society. They have played a major role in liberating the economy from the limits imposed 
by land, as characterized by the Industrial Revolution (Cipolla 1962, Landes 1969, Wrigley 1988, 2010, 
Allen 2009, Kander et al. 2013). There is also evidence that economies were boosted by the improving 
efficiencies of energy technologies (Ayres and Warr 2009). However, they did not simply reduce the cost 
of production by providing cheaper energy or energy services to drive the economy, substituting away 
from relatively expensive labour. Energy transitions also transformed economic activities, enabling more 
flexible and decentralised production processes (Devine 1993, Humphries 2006), spurring demographic 
and social transformations (Allen 2009) and altering political structures (Clark 1995). 
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Historical evidence also supports the expectation that per capita energy consumption and income levels 
rise together. Traditionally, the energy intensity (i.e., energy consumption-GDP ratio) has been assumed 
to follow inverse-U shape, peaking with the process of industrialization (Schurr and Netschert 1960, 
Humphrey and Stanislaw 1979, Fouquet and Pearson 1998). However, the inclusion of biomass and 
traditional energy sources in the analysis and the study of a broader range of historical experiences 
indicate that this stylized fact does not always hold, and depends on the characteristics of the economy 
(Gales et al 2006, Kander et al. 2013). Nevertheless, there is strong historical evidence for convergence in 
energy intensity today – both from industrialised economies becoming less energy-intensive and 
industrializing economies becoming more energy-intensive (Cserkelyei et al. 2016). 
In this paper, it would be impossible to summarise further the evidence produced by this vast literature. 
Instead, here, the objective of this paper is to provide some specific insights from a comprehensive 
research programme focussing on the United Kingdom’s long run energy trends and developments, and 
their relevance for energy and climate policy. The aim of the research programme was to better 
understand the evolution of the demand for and supply of energy services, which are at the core of energy 
markets, but are rarely analysed explicitly (see below).   
Before continuing, it is important to clarify why the United Kingdom experience is particularly relevant 
for today. To complete the Industrial Revolution, the United Kingdom needed to undertake a full energy 
transition (towards fossil fuels). Today, to stabilise the climate and continue to grow in a sustainable way, 
the global economy needs to undertake a full energy transition (away from fossil fuels). Thus, the British 
experience in the past and the global economy today are both experiences of leading, rather than 
following, energy transitions and ‘going into the unknown’. Thus, the former may offer insights for the 
latter. 
In the following section, this paper presents trends in the price and consumption of energy services (i.e., 
heating, power, transport and lighting) over the past three hundred years, discusses estimates of the 
related trends in income and price elasticities since the Industrial Revolution, and reviews the 
environmental impacts of energy consumption over this time period. In Section 3, this paper considers the 
transferability and relevance of past trends and experiences in the United Kingdom for future patterns of 
behaviour. Section 4 (based on this evidence) offers policy recommendations for climate policy. 
It is worth emphasizing that to provide strong lessons and direct policy recommendations while keeping 
the text concise, this paper has needed to be efficient with its words. Inevitably, this may have led to 
simplifications. The reader seeking more depth and detail is encouraged to access the referenced 
publications, and sources for the insights discussed below.    
2. Lessons from United Kingdom’s Energy History 
Insight 1. Energy is Consumed in order to Meet a Demand for Energy Services  
Energy consumers are driven by their demand for energy services (such as space and water heating, 
transportation, appliance uses and lighting), and the costs associated with these services are crucial for 
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understanding energy consumption patterns. The cost of the energy services generally combines the price 
of energy and the efficiency of the energy technology used (Fouquet 2016a).  
For example, in the nineteenth century, town gas (derived from coal) was the dominant source of lighting 
(Fouquet and Pearson 2006). A town gas lamp from the late 1820s would have generated 130 lumen-
hours per kWh; by 1916, the ‘Welsbach Mantle’ gas lamp produced more than six times more light, 870 
lumen-hours per kWh (Nordhaus 1996). With this information, and data on gas prices, the price of 
lighting can be estimated – the price of gas lighting in 1830 was £2,700 (in 2000 money) for one million 
lumen-hours (equivalent to leaving-on a 100-watt incandescent bulb for 30 days) and, in 1920, it was £40. 
Today, with LED lighting generating 66,000 lumen-hours per kWh, it costs under £1 for the same amount 
of illumination. In a similar way, consumption of gas and electricity (or other energy sources) can be 
combined with the efficiency of the technology to estimate lighting use or the consumption of other 
energy services2.  
As shown in this example, an additional advantage of focussing on energy services (rather than energy) is 
that the demand for energy services remains comparable with the introduction of new energy sources and 
technologies. Because of improvements in lighting efficiency between the nineteenth and twenty-first 
centuries, it would be difficult to properly compare long run behaviour without focusing on the service. 
Similarly, changes in vehicle efficiency pre- and post-1973 imply that the benefits (or utility) to a car user 
from consuming one litre of petrol has greatly changed over the last forty years, making it difficult to 
analyse long run demand using direct analysis of car user energy consumption. Instead, focussing on the 
energy services provided (e.g., the passenger-kilometres or lumen-hours) helps to identify very long run 
patterns in consumption that would be hidden by focussing only on the changing uses of different energy 
sources.       
Insight 2. Energy Service Prices tend to Decline in the Long Run 
Evidence indicates that, since the First Industrial Revolution, there has been an acceleration in the 
tendency of households and firms to find ways of consuming energy more efficiently, producing cheaper 
energy services (Fouquet 2008). A crucial role was played by knowledge production and its declining cost 
in driving the transformations in the energy system (stimulated initially by the creation of the patent 
system in the sixteenth century and the Scientific Revolution in the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries (Mokyr 2002)) and of the diffusion of new energy technologies. This was facilitated by the 
                                                          
2 So, while lighting is measured in terms of lumen-hours (where one million lumen-hours is equivalent to leaving-on a 100-watt 
incandescent bulb for 30 days), passenger transport is measured as passenger-kilometres (km), that is, moving one passenger one 
km, and freight transport as tonne-km. Residential heating is measured as one tonne of oil equivalent (toe) of effective heating – 
that is, if a heating system converts one toe (or the calorific equivalent of one toe of firewood, coal, natural gas or electricity) into 
heating with 100% efficiency, then one toe of ‘effective heating’ has been consumed. If the heating system is only 10% efficient, 
as eighteenth century fireplaces were, then the same amount of fuel would only provide one-tenth of one toe of effective heating.       
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introduction of new energy sources, such as coal/town gas, petroleum products, electricity and natural 
gas. These improvements made energy services more affordable and undoubtedly improved well-being. 
 
Energy
Energy Services
Source: Fouquet (2011)
 
Figure 1. Average Price of Energy and of Energy Services3 in the United Kingdom (1700-2008) 
 
                                                          
3 The energy service price series only exists as an indexed average price series (1900 = 100) – there is no other unit of 
measurement, because each energy service price has its own unit of measurement, so, the only way to combine them is by 
converting them into an index. Thus, each individual energy service (passenger transport, lighting, etc..) price series was 
converted from its specific units (e.g., passenger-kms, lumen-hours, etc.. – see footnote 2 for details) into an index where 1900 = 
100 and combined by weighting them by the consumer expenditures associated with each energy service. Inevitably, over more 
than three hundred years, the weighting of expenditures changed considerably (with a declining expenditure on power and 
lighting, and a rising expenditure on transport services). These changes should be kept in mind when considering an average 
price series.        
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Nordhaus (1996) and Fouquet (2011a) showed that there has been a divergence between the price of 
energy and of energy services (see Figure 1). While average energy prices may have increased (as they 
did in the second-halves of the eighteenth and twentieth centuries), decreased (e.g., in the first-halves of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) or stayed stable (e.g., in the first-halves of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries), the price of energy services has tended to fall in the long run. The divergence implies 
that focussing exclusively on energy prices and consumption and failing to consider energy services will 
lead to misleading conclusions about energy consumption behaviour.  
An example of this divergence was associated with the beginning of the transition away from town gas 
towards electricity for lighting. While individual fuel prices (i.e., for town gas and electricity) were 
declining at the beginning of the twentieth century, average energy prices for lighting remained stable. 
Over that period, the price of lighting fell dramatically (Fouquet 2011). The reason for the divergence was 
that the consumers, interested in cheaper energy services, increasingly bought more expensive energy 
sources (i.e., electricity rather than town gas) but which were used in conjunction with much more 
efficient energy technologies. At the beginning of the twentieth century, town gas was cheaper than 
electricity per unit of energy, but electric lighting technology was six times more efficient at converting 
the energy into lumens (Nordhaus 1996). As electricity prices fell (and particularly once they were less 
than six times the price of town gas), consumers made the transition to electric lighting – but, this also 
implied that the average price of energy for lighting had gone up, though the average price of lighting had 
fallen. By the mid-twentieth century, electricity had taken-over the majority of the lighting market 
(Fouquet and Pearson 2006).        
Insight 3. Energy Service Consumption Rises in the Long Run 
These declining prices of energy services, along with rising incomes, have driven-up energy service 
consumption and, as a consequence, energy consumption – with the former far out-pacing the latter. 
Indeed, income growth played a crucial role in driving-up demand in the United Kingdom. Thus, with 
probable continuation of declining energy service prices (as consumers invest in more efficient 
technologies) and likely rising incomes, one might expect future trends in the consumption of energy 
services to continue upwards. However, the size of the increases depends crucially on income and price 
elasticities, which, in turn, may depend on the phase of economic development.  
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Figure 2. Consumption of Energy Services in the United Kingdom, Index 1900=100, 1700-2010  
 
Insight 4. Income Elasticities Change with Economic Development  
The responsiveness of energy consumption to changes in income and prices (i.e., the income and price 
elasticities) have changed through time. The main finding from Fouquet (2014) is that, as the United 
Kingdom economy developed over the last two hundred years, trends in income elasticities followed an 
inverse U-shape curve4 (see Figure 3, top-half). For instance, they reached a peak (about 2.3, 3.0 and 4.0 
for income elasticities of demand for heating, transport and lighting, respectively) in the nineteenth 
century (at levels of GDP per capita below $(2010) 6,000. For example, when GDP per capita was around 
$(2010) 4,000, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a 10% increase in per capita income would 
                                                          
4 For a discussion of the methods used to estimate income and price elasticities, please see the appendix.      
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lead to a 30% rise in transport use. Similarly, a 10% increase in per capita income would lead to a 40% 
rise in lighting consumption. 
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Figure 3. Income and Price Elasticities of Demand for Energy Services, 1800-2010  
 
After the peaks, there were, at first, rapid declines, then more gradual declines. Income elasticities took 
almost 100 years to reach unity (that is, a 10% increase in income led to a 10% rise in energy service 
consumption), in the mid-twentieth century, at between $(2010) 9,000-12,000 per capita. The results also 
indicate that income elasticities were significantly different from zero at high levels of per capita income 
in the twenty-first century, implying that current increases in income generate rises in energy service 
consumption (roughly, around 5% rises for a 10% increase in income). These rises feed through directly 
into greater energy consumption.  
In other words, consumers at lower levels of income were much more responsive to income changes than 
wealthier consumers. One could expect developing country energy service (and energy) consumption to 
rise much more with income than in developed economies. For instance, if China, currently with a per 
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capita income of $6,000 (in 2010 dollars), were to follow a similar trend in income elasticities (as the 
United Kingdom did historically), then they would have recently peaked and started to decline. Based on 
the same assumption, however, India’s income elasticities might be starting to peak. After the peak, 
however, income elasticities would remain above unit elasticity for many decades, implying further 
sizable increases in energy consumption.5   
That developing economies follow inverse U-shaped income elasticities is very possible, even probable, 
given saturation effects – that is, an additional unit of energy service generates less benefit or utility to the 
consumer. However, that they peak and reach unit elasticity at similar levels of per capita GDP as the 
United Kingdom is highly uncertain. Because today´s developing economies have access to cheaper 
energy services (relative to what the United Kingdom faced when it had a similar income level), they may 
experience smoother trends in elasticities (i.e., smaller and earlier peaks). This means that compared to 
the historical experience in the United Kingdom, these economies may (at their elasticity peaks) 
experience smaller increases in energy consumption due to rising incomes and declining energy service 
prices (Fouquet 2014). 
Insight 5. Rebound Effects6 Change with Economic Development  
Similarly, price elasticities also change as per capita income rises. The price elasticity of demand for 
energy services also peaked (at values of about -1.5) at levels of per capita income of between $(2010) 
4,000 and $(2010) 5,000 (See Figure 3, bottom-half). That is, in the United Kingdom in the 1870s and 
1880s, a 10% reduction in energy prices or a 10% improvement in energy efficiency (both reducing the 
price of energy services) increased transport and lighting use by around 15% (Fouquet 2014). Any price 
elasticity less than -1 (that is, more than 1 in absolute terms) leads to a greater increase in energy service 
use than the efficiency improvement, and increases in energy consumption. This implies that, in the 
1870s, energy efficiency improvements associated with transport and lighting led to rises in energy 
                                                          
5 It is not proposed that China or India will follow the same trend (although, they might). Instead, this cross-country comparison 
is made to provide a concrete example of applying directly the United Kingdom’s experience to present-day industrialising 
economies. The transferability of these lessons to present-day experiences is discussed in Section 3.              
6 Rebound effects refer to consumer, producer and market responses to energy efficiency improvements. They include a direct 
effect on the consumption of energy services and, thus, energy in response to a higher efficiency improvement and lower energy 
service price. There are also indirect effects on consumption behaviour related to complements and substitutes of the cheaper 
energy service (and associated energy source) and related to a probable increase in purchasing power (after taking account of the 
expenditure on the new efficient technology) and, therefore, increase in the consumption of other goods and services. Finally, 
macroeconomic rebound effects occur because the reduction in the price of energy services tends to boost the economy, 
stimulating further energy service and energy consumption. Thus, for instance, a 10% improvement in energy efficiency is 
unlikely to lead to a 10% saving in energy use. Instead, the sizes of the different and combined rebound effects are empirical 
questions (see, for instance, Sorrell 2009, Gillingham 2014).              
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consumption. One might suspect that developing economies today (e.g., around $(2010) 5,000 income per 
capita) may have high price elasticities of demand for energy services and, therefore, experience large 
rebound effects.  
Just like income elasticities, price elasticities tend to fall (in absolute terms) as income increases. This 
means that the direct (i.e., excluding indirect and macroeconomic) rebound effects have tended to fall 
with economic development. Price elasticities of demand for energy services tend to be between -0.1 and 
-0.5, implying between 90% and 50%, respectively, of the efficiency improvements are fed into energy 
savings and from 10% to 50%, respectively, lead to increases in energy service consumption. 
These results offer the beginnings of a stylised fact about the relationship between elasticities of demand 
and economic development. That is, at very low levels of economic development, consumers focus on 
meeting basic needs, particularly food and cooking. As income grows, shelter and indoor climate become 
important – such as space and water heating, in temperate climates. As income rises further, these 
demands start to grow less proportionately than income (e.g., income and price elasticities for heating 
fall). In turn, other demands are met, for instance, mobility, lighting and entertainment (implying rising 
income and price elasticities for transport and lighting demand). As income increases further, these 
income and price elasticities start to fall. Thus, following confirmation from further studies, these general 
patterns could help to guide forecasts of energy service and, therefore, energy consumption. For example, 
while the IEA (2014) does incorporate saturation into its models (thus, implying declining elasticity 
through time), they do not take account of the likelihood of peaking elasticities in developing economies.   
Insight 6. The Impact of an Energy Transition on Energy Use Depends on Price Elasticities  
Grübler (1998) noted that a characteristic of historical energy transitions is that they led to dramatic 
increases in energy consumption. This was certainly true of energy transitions in the nineteenth century 
(see Figure 4). The resulting increase in energy consumption depends, first, on the decline in the price of 
energy services associated with the transition and, second, on the price elasticities of demand for energy 
services. At the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, energy service prices fell 
rapidly (see Figure 1) and the elasticities were very high (see Figure 3). In the twentieth century, the 
energy transitions to oil, gas and electricity also drove down the prices of energy services (see Figure 1). 
However, the price elasticities of demand for energy services were lower (see Figure 3). As a 
consequence, the increases in consumption of energy services and of energy were less dramatic (see 
Figure 4).    
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Figure 4. Energy Consumption by Energy Service in the United Kingdom (mtoe), 1700-2010  
 
Insight 7. The Energy Intensity of the Economy depends on (i) the Demand for Energy Services and 
(ii) the Energy Efficiency with which these Services are Provided  
The demand for particular energy services changes at different phases of economic development. In 
Britain, income and price elasticities of demand for energy services (i.e., consumer responsiveness to 
changes) peaked between 1825 and 1875 (see Figure 3). Similarly, Figure 4 displays Britain’s dramatic 
increase in final user energy consumption related to industrial heating and power during the nineteenth 
century, which probably also reflect peaking income and price elasticities (though, they are harder to 
estimate because of the circular causality between energy services use for productive (rather than 
consumptive) activities and GDP). Thus, the Industrial Revolution (and particularly the technological 
innovations coupled with the cheap, abundant energy reserves driving down prices of energy services) 
enabled the British economy to become more heat-intensive, power-intensive and transport-intensive.  
Industrial 
Power
Industrial 
Heating
Source: updated from Fouquet (2008)
Domestic 
Heating
Passenger 
Transport
Freight 
Transport
Lighting
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This is reflected in the rise in energy intensity during the eighteenth and especially the first half of the 
nineteenth century (see Figure 5). This trend can be seen in two ways: first, because energy services were 
becoming cheaper, firms found ways to produce (e.g., per one pound sterling of GDP) using more heat, 
power and transport, which implied consuming more energy; and, second, the amount of energy required 
to produce energy services remained high until the second half of the nineteenth century.     
Source: Fouquet (2014)
Final 
User 
Energy 
Intensity
Primary 
Energy 
Intensity
Figure 5. Energy Intensity in the United Kingdom, 1700-2010  
 
However, from the mid-nineteenth century, the energy intensity declined consistently. That is, the 
economy no longer needed as much energy to produce one pound sterling of GDP. This could occur for 
two reasons, either, because the economy became less heat-intensive, power-intensive and transport-
intensive or it produced each unit of heat, power and transport more efficiently. Figure 6 (representing 
‘energy service intensity’, that is, the amount of energy service consumption relative to the GDP of the 
total economy) indicates that, certainly until the 1920s (i.e., about £(2000) 3,500 or $(2010) 6,500 per 
capita GDP), this was, in great part, due to improving efficiency. For instance, the economy became more 
power-intensive and freight transport-intensive during the second half of the nineteenth century. Iron 
production intensity, which was a great consumer of heating and energy, did decline from the 1870s, 
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indicating a possible decline in the need for heating to produce one pound sterling (or dollar) of GDP. 
This indicates that, as an economy industrialises, the demand for energy services for production evolves: 
first, the economy becomes heat-intensive to produce iron and steel to build the infrastructure and the 
foundation of the economy; then, it needs power to produce (producer and consumer) goods and it needs 
freight services to distribute those goods around the economy. While the reality is much more complex, it 
offers a crude model of energy requirements as economies industrialise. In other words, the energy 
intensity of the economy is likely to experience upwards pressures as it industrialises.  
Source: Updated from Fouquet (2008)
Iron Production 
Intensity
Power 
Intensity
Freight 
Transport 
Intensity
 
Figure 6. Energy Service Intensity in the United Kingdom, 1700-2000 
 
Another important factor is the energy efficiency with which these services are provided. Figure 7 shows 
the efficiency of three key energy services (i.e., the amount of iron, power and transport provided per 
tonne of oil equivalent) for determining energy intensity. Interestingly, the amount of iron, power and 
transport produced per unit of energy fell from the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century in Great 
Britain. This was largely due to the transition away from biomass-based production to the highly 
inefficient coal-based energy technologies. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that 
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the efficiencies of these coal-based technologies improved, possibly because of concerns about rising coal 
scarcity (Fouquet 2015). This beginning of improved efficiency coincides with the peak of energy 
intensity in the United Kingdom (see Figure 5). Efficiency continued to improve rapidly throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century and started to falter before the 1970s oil shocks. This trend, no doubt, 
had an important influence on the decline in energy intensity of the British economy.  
 
Figure 7. Average Efficiency by Energy Service in the United Kingdom, 1700-2010 
 
It is also valuable to compare the British energy intensity experience with those in a number of European 
economies (see Figure 8). United Kingdom
7
 and Germany experienced major increases in energy 
intensity. The energy intensity in France and the Netherlands increased modestly with industrialisation at 
                                                          
7
 Note that the United Kingdom’s energy intensity differs slightly in the earlier period in Figure 5 and 8 because of 
different data sources. 
Passenger 
Transport 
Efficiency
Iron 
Production 
Efficiency
Source: Adapted from data in Fouquet (2008)
Power 
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the end of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, Italy’s industrialisation process was achieved without 
increasing its energy intensity. Interestingly, Britain and Germany were both the first economies to 
industrialise, using inefficient technology (by today’s standards) and exporting an important share of their 
production. They also had access to the large and cheap coal reserves. France, the Netherlands and Italy 
followed later, using more efficient technology, exporting less and not having access to such large and 
cheap coal reserves. 
Source: Kander et al. (2013)
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Netherlands
Italy
 
Figure 8. Energy Intensity in European Countries (Megajoules per GDP per capita), 1800-2008   
 
This historical experience indicates that developing economies are likely to experience substantial 
increases in the demand for energy services as they develop – first for industrial heating, then industrial 
power and freight transport, as the production side of the economy expands. As per capita income levels 
rise, economies are likely to increase their demand for consumption energy services, such as indoor 
comfort (whether heating or air-conditioning depending on the climate), passenger transport, and power 
residential appliances, including lighting, computing, information and communication. These are likely to 
feed through into greater energy consumption. However, as Marcotullio and Schulz (2007) showed, 
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European historical experiences also highlight how economies can develop and increase energy service 
consumption, while reducing their energy intensity (partly by importing energy-intensive goods from 
industrialising economies) and therefore limiting their rise in energy consumption. Thus, these trends 
highlight that the experiences in one country need to be applied with care to generate lessons for other 
countries.   
Insight 8. The External Costs of Energy Consumption Can Increase Dramatically 
After a period of declining coal prices and soaring consumption of energy services and, thus, of coal, 
which fuelled the First and part of the Second Industrial Revolution, the nineteenth century British firms 
and households were externalising the social costs of energy production and consumption on a massive 
scale. In the 1880s, nearly £(2000) 20 billion (around 20% of GDP) of estimated damage was being 
caused by air pollution resulting from coal combustion (see Figure 9
8
). Interestingly, air pollution in 
China in 1995 was estimated to have caused damage equivalent to 9% of GDP (Matus et al. 2012).     
The British economy in the second half of the nineteenth century was highly dependent on coal, 
particularly for industrial and space heating and industrial power. At the time, improvements in energy 
efficiency were leading to greater energy consumption because of high price elasticities of demand for 
energy services. An important factor was that the damage associated with air pollution appears to have 
been non-linear in the second half of the nineteenth century. For instance, while average air pollution 
concentrations in London increased by an estimated 30% between 1840 and 1890, deaths attributed to 
bronchitis in London increased from 20 to 300 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (Fouquet 2011b).     
In the second half of the twentieth century, transport became the source of new air pollution problems. 
Until the 1980s, and the rapid uptake of unleaded petrol, lead was a major source of air pollution-related 
health damage; as unleaded petrol was phased-out, associated pollution declined. Particulate matter, 
however, continues to be a hazard today, responsible for around 70% of energy-related external costs 
from the transport sector.  
Yet, although considerable uncertainty about the value (Pindyck 2013), the estimated damage from 
carbon dioxide emissions has continued to increase. Because of the rising damage placed on a tonne of 
carbon dioxide emitted as carbon concentrations have accumulated (Kunnas et al 2014), the estimated 
damage from the United Kingdom economy doubled between 1980 and 2000 to £(2000) 12 billion – 
equivalent to 1% of GDP. Similarly, the share of climate change impacts in total external costs (shown in 
Figure 9) was estimated to have increased from 27% in 1980 to 46% in 2000. This trend is likely to 
continue. Thus, while the reductions in coal use led to a decline in total energy-related external costs 
during the twentieth century, these external costs have risen again, close to £30bn (or 2.4% of GDP) in 
2000, due to transport-related air pollution and carbon dioxide emissions. The evidence (see Figure 9) 
shows that energy service consumption has gone through three phases of external costs, where a particular 
                                                          
8
 For a discussion of the methods used to estimate external costs, please see the appendix.  
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problem dominated. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, fires were a major social threat (the 
property damage associated with the Great Fire of London in 1666 was equivalent to 16% of England’s 
GDP at the time (Fouquet 2008 p.201)); in the nineteenth century, it was air pollution from coal 
consumption; and in the twentieth and twenty-first century, climate change is the new problem, and could 
increase dramatically, outweighing the benefits from consuming energy services.    
 
Figure 9. Energy-Related External Costs from Air Pollution and Climate Change in the United 
Kingdom, 1700-2000  
 
Insight 9. Energy Transitions depend on the Price of Energy Services and Income Elasticities 
Historically, the important drivers for the energy transitions were the opportunity to produce cheaper 
and/or better energy services (Fouquet 2010). In a majority of cases, a successful new energy source or 
technology provided the same service (i.e. heating, power, transport or light) with superior or additional 
characteristics (e.g. easier, cleaner or more flexible to use). Often, after their introduction, the price of the 
service they provided was higher than from the incumbent energy source. This implied that their adoption 
Power
Industrial 
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Passenger 
Transport
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Heating
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Source: based on data in Fouquet (2011b)
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was limited to niche markets. However, because some consumers were willing to pay a premium for those 
better or additional characteristics, these technologies could be refined and costs could fall gradually. 
Once the price of the service fell sufficiently (either because the energy efficiency improved or the price 
of energy declined), full transitions could occur. Nevertheless, since the Industrial Revolution, it has 
taken, on average, nearly fifty years for sector-specific energy transitions (i.e. the diffusion of energy 
sources and technologies) to unfold
9
 (see Figure 10). 
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Source: Fouquet (2008)  
Figure 10. Share of Primary Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom (1500-2000) 
 
Another factor that is likely to influence the speed of uptake of new technologies and energy transitions is 
the growth in demand for energy services. Faster growth (due to high income elasticities and rising 
incomes) is likely to imply a faster potential energy transitions. This also suggests that energy transitions 
may be more demand-led. Alternatively, when income elasticities are low, demand may be less of a driver 
                                                          
9
 Rubio and Folchi (2012) show that countries in Latin America with smaller markets for energy tended to be faster 
to make the transition out of coal and into oil. 
 19 
 
of energy transitions. Instead, when income elasticities are low, such as at high levels of economic 
development, energy transitions may have to be led by supply-side transformations. Thus, the policy 
drivers for stimulating energy transitions in developing economies and post-industrialised economies may 
be very different.     
Insight 10. Climate Policy is likely to be Weak until Low Carbon Energy Sources and Technologies 
are Competitive  
Throughout history, citizens, observing damages related to air pollution, have demanded improvements in 
environmental quality, generally through legislation. Past attempts to instigate environmentally benign 
energy transitions can offer insights for climate mitigation strategies and efforts to direct the economy 
along a low carbon pathway (Fouquet 2012). In particular, the public reaction following the Big Smog of 
1952, when around 12,000 people died from coal-emitted air pollution, led to the introduction of the 
Clean Air Act and smoke-free zones, and the accelerated uptake of gas for cooking and heating. However, 
examples of environmental demands in nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain show that while 
environmental campaigners may manage to get draft legislation introduced, industrialists often managed 
to weaken the Parliamentary bill´s effectiveness and its enforcement. Nevertheless, each time demands 
for environmental improvements were made, they sent signals both to government (to introduce effective 
legislation) and to polluters (that they should seek low pollution solutions and, if they find sufficiently 
cheap alternatives, to introduce them rather than lobby against the bill and its enforcement). Thus, the 
development of effective and sustained environmental legislation was not a one-off ´game´, but rather an 
iterative series of demands (and opposition) that could take decades or centuries to unfold, eventually 
leading to a sufficiently low-cost solution for polluters to stop opposing the demands (or possibly the 
disappearance of the problem, because of the decline of the polluting industries). Thus, in the meantime, 
to achieve a transition towards environmentally-benign energy technologies and sources is likely to need 
persistent and consistent global collective action.  
However, even in this situation, vested interests associated with incumbent energy sources and 
technologies (e.g., the fossil fuel industry) might hinder the diffusion of low carbon energy sources and 
technologies (Barbier 2013), keeping the global economy on a socially inferior pathway. The influence of 
vested interests, as well as other technological, institutional and behavioural lock-ins, implies path 
dependencies in the energy system (Aghion et al 2014). In other words, the demand for climate 
stabilisation and the development of successful climate policies are likely to follow a similarly protracted 
course. 
 
3. Transferability of Historical Lessons to Future Patterns of Behaviour 
A key issue for this paper is the relevance and transferability of the historical evidence to present-day 
industrialised and developing economies. Theory acts as the conduit between past experiences and lessons 
for understanding future behaviour and formulating policies. However, at present, no formal economic 
theory of how income and price elasticities vary at different phases of economic development exists 
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(Lewbel 2007). Instead, an inverse-U relationship between income elasticities and economic development 
is explained informally as due to structural change (Medlock 2009), as discussed in Insight 4 and 5.  
In the absence of a theory, a rich empirical literature supports the view that income elasticities of energy 
demand (i.e., not energy service demand) fall as economies reach high per capita income levels (Galli 
1998, Judson 1999, Medlock and Soligo 2001, van Bentham and Romani 2009, van Bentham 2015). The 
trends in elasticities for the three separate energy service demands (heating, transport and lighting) in the 
United Kingdom over two hundred years (shown in Figure 3) are consistent with the evidence for energy 
demand, though with higher peaks for energy services and upward trends in income elasticities at very 
low levels of economic development. Given that studies of energy demand and energy service demand 
have found that income elasticities are high (i.e., greater than one) at mid-income per capita levels, the 
evidence presented in this brief appears to be highly transferrable to present-day situations – for instance, 
it is probable that developing economies will broadly follow inverse U-shaped income elasticity trends 
and U-shaped price elasticity trends.  
Clearly, many factors will be different between these experiences and future ones, and it would be 
important to identify how changing knowledge, technologies, infrastructure and institutions, amongst 
other variables, alter these patterns of behaviour. In particular, thought needs to be given to how the peaks 
and the steepness of curves might differ as current developing economies have access to energy sources 
and technologies at earlier levels of economic development. In the context of energy demand, it has been 
proposed that economies that develop later will have access to more efficient technologies at a lower level 
of economic development and, therefore, will have lower energy intensities than leading economies 
(Medlock 2009). Certainly, Britain, as the first economy to experience the Industrial Revolution, may 
well be an extreme case. As discussed in Insight 8, a comparison of the histories of Britain and Germany 
with other European economies supports this view - though other factors, such as exports of 
manufacturing productions and average price of energy (and, of course, energy services), were also very 
different - so, this does not directly tell us about income elasticities. Marcotullio and Schulz (2007) 
showed that the USA was also an energy intensive economy compared with others at similar levels of 
GDP per capita. Using a larger historical database, Csereklyei et al (2016) find that, although they tend to 
broadly converge at high levels of per capita income, some (but certainly not all) economies did exhibit 
flat energy intensity trends in the long run. Interestingly, this evidence partially contrasts with a recent 
study which finds that present-day developing economies are experiencing higher energy intensities at the 
same per capita income levels (i.e., within the $3,500-$10,000 range) as present-day OECD countries did 
historically (van Bentham 2015). The author states that this finding is consistent with the argument 
developed in Fouquet (2014) and Insight 4 that, because of access to more modern energy sources and 
technologies, present-day developing economies may experience earlier and smaller elasticity peaks. 
Thus, with no theory to be guided by nor other energy service demand studies to be compared with, but 
strong support from energy demand literature, it seems appropriate to conclude that earlier and lower 
peaks are likely to characterise trends in income (and price) elasticities of demand for energy services.     
Regarding lessons about energy transitions, the free rider problem of low carbon energy makes the 
applicability of past lessons more problematic and needs greater caution. Nevertheless, some of the basic 
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points - about how the incentives will influence consumers’ likelihood of adopting new energy 
technologies and sources, and about the process through which the demand for environmental quality 
gradually leads to policies – are generally transferable to present and future situations.  
4. Policy Recommendations for Climate Policy 
Policy Recommendation 1: Formulate Integrated Energy Service Policies  
The focus of most climate mitigation analysis on energy (rather than energy services) risks producing 
misleading advice when considering long run issues. It is based on a failure to consider consumer motives 
in energy-related behaviour and a lack of data on energy services (such as space and water heating, 
cooking, transportation, lighting, communication and computing). Today, policy-makers should be 
focussing on what drives consumer behaviour and improves wellbeing. As discussed in Insight 1, if a 
consumer’s energy consumption falls, it does not necessarily imply that this person is worse-off. For 
example, if energy consumption fall by 5%, but energy efficiency improves by 5%, then energy service 
consumption has remained constant, and consumer wellbeing has not changed. On the other hand, if 
energy service consumption falls then the consumer is likely to be worse off. So, policy-makers should be 
seeking to increase more affordable and available energy services, not necessarily energy consumption.  
As a consequence, it is important to develop policies that focus explicitly on energy services. Government 
policies related to energy markets (such as market liberalisation or regulation, and the promotion of 
competition) are unlikely to be based on a consideration of, for instance, their impact on investments in 
energy-using equipment and how efficiency might be affected by lower energy prices. Indeed, although 
this is not a forum for questioning the merits of promoting competition, one might expect that a phase of 
declining prices associated with market liberalisation will stimulate consumers to invest in energy-using 
equipment that is less energy efficient and incorporates characteristics that are more energy-intense 
(Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins 1999, Popp 2002) – after all, the period of low energy prices in the 1990s 
stimulated investment in heavier vehicles, such as SUVs (Knittel 2011). In fact, Ito and Sallee (2014) 
show the inefficiencies in policies that have allowed lower efficiency standards for these heavier vehicles. 
Thus, despite the undoubted benefits these characteristics provide, there is a long run trade-off between 
lower energy prices and higher investment in energy efficiency. Here, it is proposed that governments 
should take account of the trade-offs between energy prices and efficiency investment in the long run and 
ideally find the optimal trade-off between them. As will be discussed in the third recommendation, the 
trade-off between prices and efficiency improvements might differ at different phases of economic 
development, and the optimal policy should reflect this difference.  
However, energy service policies should go beyond, simply looking at balancing energy prices and 
technical efficiency. They should try to integrate policies related to the pricing and provision of energy 
sources with those focussing on promoting energy efficiency improvements, including research, 
development and demonstration (R,D&D)) and considerations about behavioural features to address the 
energy efficiency gap (Gillingham and Palmer 2014) – and not exclusively through efficiency standards, 
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which have received considerable criticism (Anderson et al 2011). In other words, they should actively 
develop energy service policies.  
They should develop a broader and more strategic approach to thermal comfort, mobility, illumination 
and computing. Yet, once they are thought of in those terms, the interconnections between energy 
services (particularly related to energy markets) risk being lost. Identifying which ministry is responsible 
for thermal comfort, mobility, illumination and computing is unclear. In fact, many would feel 
uncomfortable with the idea that a ministry is needed to achieve such objectives – would it fit within the 
remit of a “ministry of physical/material well-being”? This goes beyond (or more precisely offers a more 
concrete example of) the recommendations of Stiglitz et al (2010) on alternatives to GDP measurement. 
So, more thought is needed about how to achieve a cheaper provision of these services in a sustainable 
way without directly interfering with households’ individual decisions and lives. 
An important first step is to encourage ministries responsible for energy to collect annual statistics on the 
consumption and price of providing energy used for end-uses and energy services (which incorporates the 
efficiency of the related technologies). DECC had been collecting data on end-use energy consumption 
irregularly since the late 1990s, and these have, since the late 2000s, become a fundamental part of its 
Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics (DUKES). Since 2005, DECC has undertaken a more 
concerted effort to collect data on the efficiency of energy technologies, as reflected in the Household 
Energy Efficiency Database (HEED), which is particularly focussed on the quality of the heating systems 
and housing stock, although this process is challenging and remains far from comprehensive (Foulds and 
Powell 2014). This is a new development and, in general, ministries around the world have tended to 
ignore the efficiency of energy technologies. They should seek to measure energy efficiency 
improvements and incorporate the data into their digests (Hamilton et al 2013). Furthermore, ministries 
need to combine energy and efficiency data to generate valuable energy service data. These will enable 
stakeholders to observe the success of policies aiming at providing cheaper energy services while 
reducing energy use.    
Policy Recommendation 2: Prices Matter, especially in the Long Run 
One of the major challenges associated with climate policy is that, in the long run, rising income and high 
income elasticities drive-up energy service and, therefore, energy consumption. However, there are no 
obvious climate policy instruments related to income or income elasticities. Thus, the main source of 
leverage for climate policy-makers is influencing the price of energy services (either the price of energy
10
 
or the efficiency of energy technologies).  
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 In the short run, the market conditions under which energy is delivered (e.g., competition, monopoly or oligopoly) 
also heavily influence the final price to consumers for energy services. However, higher energy prices tend to feed 
through into more improvements in energy efficiency (Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins 1999, Popp 2002), which, in the 
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After all, consumers (and producers) react to incentives. Especially in the long run, consumers respond to 
relative prices which can push them either towards environmentally damaging or towards 
environmentally benign decisions. If there are, for instance, taxes on carbon emissions, consumers can put 
up with additional costs of environmentally unfriendly behaviour in the short run perhaps because they 
are locked in to technologies and processes that are expensive to substitute in the short run. However, in 
the long run, the burden of environmentally damaging behaviour being taxed is likely to push consumers 
towards environmentally friendly decisions, if competitive substitutes are available.  
Especially for durable goods, such as plant and equipment embodying energy technologies, expectations 
of long run additional costs associated with environmentally damaging behaviour may well be decisive in 
swaying investment decision-making. The prospect of locking oneself into an expensive pattern of energy 
service consumption by selecting a particular technology is likely to be unattractive to consumers, if it 
polluting and the polluters has to pay for the emissions (see Insight 9). Thus, clear long run price signals 
are important for directing the momentum of an economy towards a low carbon economy.  
Changing policies (particularly market-based instruments) in the short run is not constructive. This is 
often the result of political intervention driven by vested interests, either succumbing to the influences of 
powerful energy companies or appealing to voters. However, if the policies are clear, and unambiguously 
designed to discourage broadly agreed upon undesirable outcomes, and unquestionably encouraging 
broadly-agreed-upon objectives, they are likely to be harder to overturn than highly specific policies with 
ambiguous virtues. Thus, the government should clearly identify the direction sought and allow the 
momentum of market forces to work, while being aware of and redressing negative social impacts.   
As discussed in Insight 10, following the Big Smog and the ensuing Clean Air Act, the British 
government banned the use of smoke-emitting fuels in certain zones in the 1960s. This radical 
environmental measure imposed temporary increases in the price of residential heating, as consumers 
were generally forced to switch to cleaner, but more expensive, fuels. Within a decade, the price of 
heating had fallen below its pre-Clean Air Act level, as consumers adopted more efficient technologies.  
Introducing taxes or permits on carbon emissions are unlikely to be popular with polluters. However, for 
the average consumer, the increase in costs is likely to be short-lived. The long run trend in the price of 
energy services is generally downward (see Insight 2). Furthermore, after introducing taxes, say, there 
will be a heightened incentive to adopt more efficient ways of providing the energy services, which will 
enable the price of providing those energy services to fall. Thus, especially if energy efficient 
technologies are available, but not always invested-in, imposing a cost on environmentally unfriendly 
behaviour might accelerate the reduction in the price of energy services.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
long run, are likely to reduce energy service prices more than the upward pressure due to the imperfectly-
competitive market structure.  
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So, government should explain to the public that these temporarily higher prices are part of a package of 
measures, including targeted energy efficiency investments, seeking to encourage cheaper services, and 
less energy use and carbon emissions.  
Furthermore, care should be taken about the distributive effects of carbon taxes or prices. When 
introduced, they risk being regressive, in that poorer households spend more of their budget on energy or 
energy service than wealthy homes. Furthermore, these measures can be ‘dynamically regressive’. That 
is, poorer households will suffer the most over time. This is because poorer households are frequently the 
last to invest in new energy efficient technologies, which enable the price of energy services to fall. So, 
especially following the imposition of new taxes or permits, a possible strategy would be to encourage 
them to invest in energy efficient technology, through subsidies.  
Policy Recommendation 3: Energy Service Policies in Periods of Rapid Development are Crucial 
As mentioned in Insights 4 and 5, consumer responses to rising income, energy price changes and energy 
efficiency improvements will differ as an economy develops. Insight 9 proposes that this may also be the 
case for energy transitions. Industrialising economies are likely to need relatively large increases in 
heating and power. As they develop, they might also be seeking far more transportation, and probably a 
lot more lighting, entertainment, communication and computing, as well powering of other residential 
appliances. Thus, policies that work against these market forces are likely to be counter-productive.  
Indeed, the process of industrialisation is likely to be a period of high investment in energy-using 
equipment, such as personal vehicles and residential appliances - based on the peaks in income elasticities 
in Figure 3 as indicators, rapid investment might occur when per capita incomes are between $(2010) 
3,000-6,000. Households (with generally high discount rates) are likely to invest in inefficient 
technologies. This phase of economic development is generally also a period of heavy investment in 
energy-related infrastructure, including the expansion of the transport network.  
Industrialisation is a phase of high adjustments and substitutability (as represented by the high elasticities 
at mid-level incomes in Figure 3). However, once this major phase of transition and transformation is 
completed, lifestyles and production processes, as well as technologies, infrastructure, institutions and 
behaviour, become more fixed and less flexible (as represented by the low elasticities as the economy 
develops from mid-income to high-income levels in Figure 3). Thus, it is suggested that the rate of 
adjustment to higher prices is dependent on the phase of economic development, and this implies that, 
after the initial phase of industrialisation, households and firms will be slower to invest in efficient 
technology as a result of higher energy prices. Using Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) terminology, the 
process of industrialisation is a critical juncture in an economy’s history, and the outcome of these private 
and public investments are likely to strongly influence the long run energy-intensity pathway of the 
economy (Fouquet 2016b).  
Locking onto an energy-intensive pathway increases the vulnerability of the economy and the 
environment. Inevitably, higher energy consumption implies a tendency to import more, putting pressure 
on the trade deficit, and to pollute more. Crucially, economies that have followed higher energy-intensity 
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pathways tended to suffer more from the impacts of oil price shocks (Acurio-Vásconez et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, as Barbier (2011) explains, when faced with resource security issues, past governments have 
tended to favour policies that increase the supply rather moderate demand. Inevitably, for a politician, 
expanding supply is less costly in political terms than demand-side management. However, the financial 
costs of securing energy supplies can be very large in the long run (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). It also 
implies that energy supply companies wield greater political power in energy-intensive economies – thus, 
there is a high indirect political cost to pay. Furthermore, increasing supply only leads to more energy-
intensive consumption patterns. This, in turn, makes economies more vulnerable to future energy price 
shocks, creating new incentives to expand supply. Thus, this bias in the political economy of energy 
implies that locking onto an energy-intensive pathway can lead to a vicious cycle of supply-expansion 
(Fouquet 2016b).  
In other words, without careful governance and incentives, private decisions, especially in phases of 
industrialisation, can lock consumers into experiencing high energy services prices in the long run and 
the economy onto a high energy intensity trajectory with major long run impacts – related to 
environmental pollution, trade balances, inflation, vulnerability to energy price shocks, and political 
pressures from energy companies. Of course, certain geographical and other characteristics (e.g., climate, 
size, dispersion of population, and comparative advantage of energy-intensive industries) can imply that 
an economy will be relatively more energy-intensive, such as Canada or Scandinavian countries. For 
these economies, there is a tendency to require more energy per capita and this imposes, a priori, a higher 
level of vulnerability. However, many other factors, such as about energy infrastructure, taxes and 
subsidies, are within the influence of governments.   
So, periods of strong industrialisation and rapid development are crucial times for governments to 
develop policies that promote energy efficient technology investment and ensure lower long run energy 
service prices to consumers. Yet, reductions in energy price subsidies and increases in taxes on energy 
consumption are unpopular. Furthermore, energy service policies may not be seen as a government 
priority at early phases of economic development. Nevertheless, if they are combined with strong support 
for the subsidy of energy efficient technologies and information campaigns explaining the package of 
measures and their long run benefits, a government could encourage a large share of consumers to invest 
in energy efficient technologies. In other words, despite the fact that much of the initial improvements in 
energy efficiency are likely to lead to large rebound effects, the government has an opportunity to place 
its economy on a lower energy intensity trajectory (as seen in Insight 7), with huge benefits associated 
with environmental pollution, trade balances, inflation stabilisation, and reduced vulnerability to energy 
price shocks and to political pressures from large energy companies. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presented trends in the prices and consumption of energy services and in income and price 
elasticities of demand for energy services over the last three hundred years for the United Kingdom. 
Given the need to develop climate policies over decades or even centuries, this longer run perspective 
offered energy-related empirical evidence on a more appropriate timescale than is traditionally available 
 26 
 
and used. This evidence provided insights about how energy service use and energy consumption 
behaviour changed as an economy developed (i.e. the inverse-U trend in income elasticities as the 
economy developed). This understanding could provide a ‘backbone’ for long run energy consumption 
and carbon dioxide projections.  
At low levels of economic development, energy service consumption tended to be quite responsive to per 
capita income changes; at mid-levels, consumption tended to be very responsive to changes in income per 
capita; and, at high levels, consumption was less responsive to income changes. Just to provide a concrete 
example, if China were to follow a similar pattern of demand for energy services (e.g., space and water 
heating, cooling, cooking, transport, lighting and communication) as it develops as the United Kingdom 
did historically, its income elasticities would now be starting to decline – a mildly positive message for 
global carbon dioxide emissions. However, its income elasticities would not fall below unity (i.e., a 10% 
increase in income would not lead to a less than 10% increase in consumption) for many decades into the 
future – a rather pessimistic message for global carbon dioxide emissions. Although the inverse U-shaped 
trend in income elasticities is expected to hold for present-day developing economies, there might be 
reasons to anticipate that their trends will peak earlier and be less pronounced than the United Kingdom 
historically. This new understanding of how long run trends in income and price elasticities changed with 
economic development will be useful for improving projections of energy consumption and carbon 
dioxide emissions in both industrialised and developing economies, such as those produced by the IEA 
and the IPCC. 
Based on the ideas presented in this paper, several lessons for policy emerge. For instance, governments 
should seek to formulate integrated energy service policies. Governments rarely make decisions about 
energy markets and technologies related to the provision of energy services as part of an integrated 
strategy. For instance, policies should be aiming to encourage the cheaper provision of energy services 
while reducing high-carbon energy use. It is proposed that, for instance, governments should take account 
of the trade-offs between lower energy prices and lower efficiency improvements in the long run and 
ideally find the optimal trade-off between them. Furthermore, this trade-off might vary at different phases 
of economic development, and the optimal trade-offs through time should reflect this difference. Finally, 
energy service policies should go beyond simply looking at balancing energy prices and technical 
efficiency, and should develop a broader and more strategic approach to energy services, focussing 
directly on thermal comfort, mobility, illumination and computing.   
A final point is that energy service policies in phases of industrialisation are crucial for the long run 
prosperity of the economy. The process of industrialisation is a critical juncture in an economy’s history, 
in which the choices of technologies, infrastructure, institutions and behaviour are more flexible than once 
the economy has become industrialised. Without guidance and incentives, private decisions in periods of 
rapid economic development can lock consumers into experiencing high energy service prices in the long 
run and, similarly, bind the economy onto a high energy intensity trajectory with major long run impacts 
– related to environmental pollution, trade balances, inflation, vulnerability to energy price shocks, and 
political pressures from energy companies.   
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Appendix 
Summary of Method Used for Estimating Income and Price Elasticities 
The elasticity estimates were generated using annual time series data on energy service consumption, 
prices and GDP per capita from 1700 to 2010 (see Fouquet 2014). Because of the non-stationarity of the 
data (i.e., they do not revert to a mean value), vector error correction (VEC) models offered a method to 
identify the long run relationship between energy service consumption, energy service prices and income. 
An important assumption (confirmed through statistical tests) was that the causality ran from income and 
prices to consumption, and not from consumption to income and price – implying that any changes in 
income and prices were exogenous and, therefore, they could identify the demand curve. A simple 
method was then employed to estimate the trends in income and price elasticities, by estimating the 
average value for fifty year periods moving through time (Fouquet and trends in income and price 
elasticities, by estimating the average value for fifty year periods moving through time (Fouquet and 
Pearson 2012). For example, the income and price elasticities of heating demand were estimated for the 
period 1830-1879, then 1831-1880, and so on until 1961-2010. Then, the elasticity for any particular year 
would be the moving average (i.e., the average of all elasticities estimated where that year was included). 
So, for the moving average around the year 1950, fifty income elasticity of demand for residential heating 
estimates were produced (for the periods 1900-1950, 1901-1951, and so on until 1950-2000) and the 
average of all these estimates was equal to 0.60. Estimated in the same way, the average price elasticity of 
heating demand around 1950 was -0.25.      
Summary of Method Used for Estimating External Costs of Energy Services 
Figure 9 represents the value of the external damage caused by energy services (as a share of GDP) over 
the last 300 years. A value of a life year lost - the UK’s Department of Health places the value in 2005 at 
£29,000 per year lost from air pollution – was calculated for each year, by reducing the value in the past 
to take account of the lower income (and, thus, willingness or ability to pay for reductions in the risk of 
dying) and an income elasticity of 0.8, which reflected estimates based on empirical studies in 
industrialising economies (see Fouquet 2011b). So, for instance, in 1800 and 1900, the values of a life 
year lost were estimated to be £(2000)7,500 and £(2000) 10,000 respectively. While to many these 
methods are controversial, individuals, firms and policy-makers make trade-offs between money and 
mortality risks. Equally, values were placed on lives in the past – life insurance has existed in England 
since the sixteenth century, and became a major industry from the eighteenth century, even if at first only 
as a source of gambling or to replace the loss of slaves, but later to compensate relatives (Clark 1999). 
The method presented offers a crude measure of the value of the damage associated with accidental fires 
(hence, the high value for lighting in the eighteenth century), air pollution, coal mining and climate 
change – for details of the methodology for each problem, see Fouquet (2011b, 2015). While the deaths 
from fires, air pollution and coal mining are quite different from climate change damage, by placing them 
on the same graph, they help us to identify the scale of the external damage caused by energy or energy 
service use. 
